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The Rules of the Game:
Feminist Policymaking in Chile
Liesl HAAS
he fact that it is me who is here tonight is a symbol of the change we have
lived. We leave behind many fears and prejudices. Today Chilean society
is more open, more tolerant, more diverse. People don’t want only the
right to vote, but also the right to have a voice. They want to be heard. They
want to forge their own destiny. In my government we will provide a channel
for this desire for participation. We will forge a great alliance between politics
and society, between representatives and the represented. (Victory speech by
president-elect Dr. Michelle Bachelet, Santiago, Chile, January 15, 2006)
The election of Socialist Michelle Bachelet to the Chilean presidency has
enormous importance –both symbolic and practical– for Chilean women
and their ongoing struggle for full citizenship and equal rights. An
avowed feminist, she signifies the progress that Chilean women have
made since the transition to democracy in legitimizing issues of women’s
rights and in gaining greater political voice. She has already demonstrated
her commitment to expanding the gains Chilean women have made to
date to by appointing of a cabinet that is 50% female and signaling her
support for a positive discrimination law that would boost women’s
representation in the Congress. In many ways, Michelle Bachelet’s
political success would seem to represent the public face of a deeper
transformation of women’s status in Chilean society. This study evaluates
that conclusion by analyzing the progress Chilean women have gained
since the end of authoritarian rule in implementing the political goals of
the feminist movement and expanding women’s legal rights.
Thousands of Chilean women risked their lives fighting for a return to
democracy. To what extend did the democracy they get reward their
efforts? Much of the existing research on women and politics in Chile
emphasizes the ways that Chilean democracy has fallen short of the
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expectations of the feminist movement1. A number of scholars
emphasize the political dissolution of the feminist movement and the
women’s movement more broadly (Alvarez, 1999; Matear, 1997), which
has dramatically reduced the visibility of feminism as a source of
political pressure for policy reform. While some of the factors reducing
the movement’s political influence are internal in nature2, scholars have
also pointed out the ways in which the democratic transition itself and
the institutional political structure that resulted have served to
undermine women’s participation and to limit the opportunities for far-
reaching policy reforms (Alvarez, 1999; Waylen, 1993; Ríos Tobar, 2003).
Although the creation of Sernam (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), a cabinet-
level women’s rights agency, represents a permanent location for
women’s rights advocacy within the state, both members of feminist
organizations and feminist representatives in Congress lament their
secondary role in Sernam’s policymaking efforts (Richards, 2003, 2004;
Franceschet, 2003; Schild, 1998; Waylen, 1996).
Yet there have also been a number of important advances in women’s
rights since the transition to democracy. Sernam and feminist
representatives in Congress have spearheaded a broad range of policy
proposals expanding women’s equality, touching on education, health,
political representation, employment, day care, marital law, and the
constitution. Among these proposals are some notable successes, such as
the passage of legislation on domestic violence, sexual assault, day care,
employment discrimination and divorce. Women’s political
representation, while low, is on the rise across political parties, and
support for a national quota law is increasing. Perhaps more
significantly, congressional support for feminist policy proposals has
diffused beyond the small core of feminist representatives who initiated
the majority of proposals in the first democratic administrations. The
same literature that notes the political disintegration of the feminist
movement also acknowledges the wide diffusion of feminist ideals
throughout Chilean society – in the media, universities, political parties,
and public opinion (Ríos Tobar, 2003).
How can we make sense of the conflicting characterizations of the state
of women’s rights in Chile? In this article, I analyze the progress Chilean
women have made since the transition to democracy by focusing on
what is inarguably a core component of progress on women’s rights: the
1. The feminist movement, which is a subset of the broader women’s movement, seeks the
transformation of the system of gender domination. As there is no single, unified feminist
community in Chile, most scholars speak of “feminisms” or feminist movements. See
Frohman and Valdés 1993, Alvarez 1998, Baldez 1999, Ríos 2003, Blofield and Haas 2005.
2. A number of factors have negatively affected the feminist community since the
transition to democracy, including financial difficulties, exhaustion and lack of
generational replacement, a depletion of leadership to political parties, and difficulty
strategizing movement activism to fit the democratic political context.
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passage of legislation that promotes the goals of the feminist movement.
While the passage of legislation is, of course, not the only test of a
society’s openness to women’s rights, it is undeniably a critical
component of any larger program of political, cultural and economic
transformation of women’s status. The feminist movement that arose
under the dictatorship (1973-1989) articulated a well-developed agenda
for political change, and the political parties vying for representation in
the new government promised to respond to these concerns. To what
extent did democracy allow feminists to achieve political change and
implement the demands they had developed over the previous sixteen
years? By looking at legislative attempts to promote women’s equality,
we are able to examine the political responsiveness of the Chilean
government to citizen claims for equal treatment, which goes to the
heart of democratization.
The Feminist Policy Agenda
Feminist legislation seeks to eliminate all forms of economic, political,
social and cultural inequalities between women and men. It thus seeks
women’s full and equitable incorporation as citizens. Drawing on the
policy agenda developed by the feminist community under the
dictatorship, early in the first post-transition democratic administration
congressional advocates for women’s rights3 and the leadership of
Sernam began development of a wide-ranging policy agenda, touching
on a number of critical issues of women’s rights. Over the past sixteen
3. Congressional advocates for women’s rights include several representatives who self-
identify as feminist and have strong connections to the feminist movement in Chile. Many
of the first feminist policy proposals following the transition were spearheaded by these
representatives, most notably Deputies Adriana Muñoz (PS, later PPD), María Antonieta
Saa (PPD), Laura Rodriguez (PH) and Senator (and, later, Deputy) Laura Soto (PPD).
Other women representatives from the Left, such as Isabel Allende (PS), had weaker links
with organized feminist groups but were consistent advocates of feminist legislation in
the Congress and described themselves as feminists. Finally, women representatives from
the PDC, such as Deputy Mariana Aylwin and Senator Carmen Frei, were reluctant to
embrace the label “feminist” because of resistance to the term among sectors of their
party, but both were strong proponents of feminist legislation, and Aylwin, in particular,
spearheaded or co-signed numerous feminist policy proposals, most notably the success
effort to legalize divorce. Each of these representatives emphasized in interviews with the
author that they considered women’s rights a central policy concern. Since the transition,
women representatives from RN have, to varying degrees, also shown support for some
feminist policy issues. While their support is not consistent, and while these
representatives reject the label “feminist”, their degree of participation in the
development of feminist policy proposals far outpaces that of their party in general and is
an indication of the growing influence of feminism beyond its base within the Left. For
purposes of this analysis, these latter representatives are not considered feminist, due to
their explicit rejection of the label and inconsistent support for feminist policy, but their
growing political support for feminist proposals is evident in the higher number of bills
introduced by a Left-Right alliance in recent years (see Table 1).
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years, forty-two legislative proposals have been introduced to expand
women’s legal equality, across policy areas as diverse as the rights of
domestic workers, intra-family violence, sexual harassment and assault,
sex and wage discrimination, the educational rights of pregnant
students, protections for pregnant workers, day care, paternity law,
marital property rights, therapeutic abortion and divorce4.
Keeping in mind the often glacial pace of legislative reform, a number of
observations can be made from an initial analysis of the universe of
women’s rights legislation. To begin, the range of policy proposals is
impressively broad. It is also apparent that, while the majority of
proposals were introduced by congressional representatives, Sernam has
enjoyed a much higher success rate with its own legislative projects5.
Eight of nine bills introduced by Sernam eventually became law,
whereas, between 1990 and 20016, only eight out of thirty-eight
congressional bills were successful. It is worth noting that Sernam’s bills
were often successful where congressional efforts on the same topic had
failed. This was the case, for example, with bills on sex discrimination,
paternity laws, and marital property rights. Considering the range of
topics covered by congressional versus executive bills, it is clear that the
most controversial proposals –namely, abortion and divorce– which have
been the subject of multiple proposals, have only been introduced by
congressional representatives. Despite the overall low success rate of
congressional bills, they enjoyed greater success beginning in the second
administration (1994-2000). This corresponds with an increase in cross-
party sponsorship of the bills. Furthermore, the pace of legislative action
increased after 2000. This is evident both in the passage of legislation
that had been dormant for many years and in the introduction of new
proposals. Finally, the last few years have witnessed the reintroduction
of legislative proposals on reproductive rights and abortion, arguably
the most politically controversial women’s rights issues.
4. These topics have been introduced as legislation in various forms, some narrowly
focused and some more sweeping in scope, but all the bills defined as feminist in this
study deal with topics first advocated by the feminist community. As the ideals of
feminism diffuse beyond an original group of self-defined activists and the importance of
women’s equality becomes more accepted culturally and politically, we should not be
surprised to see legislation that is feminist in character supported, or even drafted, by
representatives beyond the narrowly-defined feminist community. Therefore, defining
legislation as feminist is not reducible simply to whether or not all the representatives
who introduce a particular bill self-define as feminist nor the degree to which feminists
outside the state publicly demonstrate in support of every bill. Rather, the identification
of a bill as feminist rests on the character and goal of the legislation itself, which must aim
to eliminate some form of discrimination (political, economic, etc.) faced by Chilean
women.
5. This parallels the larger dynamic of Chilean legislation, where executive proposals are
more successful than congressional efforts. See Siavelis 2000.
6. Given the slow pace of the legislative process, I have limited my comparison of success
rates of congressional bills to those introduced in 2001 or before.
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Beyond the mere fact of bill passage or failure, it is important consider
the alterations that a bill may undergo in order for it to garner enough
political support for passage. Some bills pass the Congress in a form
relatively faithful to their original composition; others are radically
transformed through negotiation and compromise and ultimately
“succeed” in a version counterproductive to the original vision of the
bill’s supporters. To what degree have the women’s rights bills that have
passed the Congress done so in a version that truly signals a victory for
feminists? Because space considerations do not allow for a detailed
examination of every piece of feminist legislation that passed the
Congress, this analysis focuses on the three bills that most clearly
illustrate both the range of success among feminist policy initiatives as
well as the political dynamics that govern negotiation on feminist bills.
I argue that two primary factors impact the success of feminist policy
proposals: the institutional structure of the Chilean political system,
which mitigates against cooperative policymaking between the
Executive and Congress, and the strength of the conservative opposition
to women’s rights, which enjoys disproportionate political influence
within the political system. While both the rigidity and undemocratic
nature of Chile’s political institutions and the continued strength of
conservative cultural forces have been widely discussed in the literature,
existing research tends to treat both as largely static forces. By contrast,
an examination of feminist policymaking reveals a political environment
that is highly dynamic. Over the past sixteen years, feminists within the
political system have learned to navigate more effectively within this
challenging institutional and cultural context. The three policy case
studies discussed below –domestic violence, therapeutic abortion, and
divorce– illustrate the evolving political strategies of advocates for
women’s rights, which have led to increased success in passing feminist
legislation.
Institutional Cooperation
Political parties in Chile span the ideological spectrum and have deep
historical roots and relatively stable electoral constituencies. However,
the change to a binomial electoral system following the transition had
the effect of forcing the parties to form broad electoral coalitions. Parties
of the Center-Left joined together in the Concertación coalition, which has
governed Chile since the transition. The parties of the Right formed an
alternative electoral coalition.
From 1990-2000, the Christian Democratic Party held the presidency
(Patricio Aylwin, 1990-4; Eduardo Frei, 1994-2000). In 2000, Socialist
Ricardo Lagos was elected President, followed by Socialist Michelle
Bachelet (2006-). The cohabitation of distinct ideological tendencies
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within the governing coalition has meant that individual parties must
balance their own policy preferences against the larger needs of the
coalition (Siavelis, 2000). In the case of women’s rights legislation, the
Left is largely unified in support of most feminist proposals, but this
support must be balanced against divisions on these issues within the
PDC. The Christian Democratic Party is reluctant to promote policy
reforms on issues that will bring it into conflict with the Catholic Church
(Blofield and Haas, 2005; Haas, 2000)7. The obstacles to reform are
greater in the Senate, where the institutional Senators and the Left’s
overall lower representation in the upper house have served to block or
stall many feminist proposals that managed to pass the Chamber of
Deputies.
Cooperation on policy is further complicated by the power of the
executive branch, which plays a dominant role in the legislative process.
Formal executive powers include the ability to determine the legislative
agenda for the majority of the year and exclusive legislative jurisdiction
over a number of crucial areas, including budgetmaking. The Executive
also has the power to declare a bill “urgent”, which keeps it alive in
committee and encourages congressional debate on the proposal.
Arguably of equal importance in the policymaking process are the
informal powers of the executive branch. The Executive counts with
considerably greater financial resources than representatives and also
has an extensive legislative staff. This allows Executive ministries to
develop bills that are often technically superior than similar
congressional proposals. In addition, informal rules of procedure allow
members of the Executive to participate in congressional committee
meetings (Siavelis, 2000; Baldez and Carey, 1999). In the case of women’s
rights legislation, this allows Sernam to craft a persuasive proposal and
to monitor it closely throughout the review process, while the authors of
congressional bills are often shut out from the relevant review
committees (Blofield and Haas, 2005).
The institutional strength of Sernam, as part of the Executive, presents
advantages and disadvantages for attempts to promote feminist policy.
The ideological orientation of the Ministry under a particular
administration is an important consideration (Baldez, 2001), as is the
personality of particular ministers (Haas, 2000). During the first
democratic administration, Sernam was headed by Christian Democrat
Soledad Alvear, who pursued an aggressive policy agenda and
promoted a number of legislative proposals. However, research notes
that this particular period was also characterized by a very moderate
7. Due to its outspoken defense of human rights under the dictatorship, the Church
enjoyed renewed political influence following the transition to democracy. It has
attempted to parlay this into influence over the policy agenda, where it strongly opposes
policy reform on many feminist issues (Blofield 2006, Haas 1999).
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approach to the content of legislative proposals as well as a tendency to
develop legislative proposals in isolation from congressional
representatives and members of the feminist community (Htun, 2003;
Baldez, 2001; Valenzuela, 1999; Waylen, 1997)8 Under the leadership of
Minister Josefina Bilbao (PDC, 1994-2000), Sernam spoke out forcefully
on a number of feminist policy issues and increased its support for
congressional proposals, but it stopped short of supporting the
decriminalization of therapeutic abortion or the legalization of divorce.
Feminists hoped that under a Socialist administration, and with a
change in the party leadership of Sernam, progress would be made on
the more contentious feminist policy proposals, but the appointment of
PPD Minister Adriana del Piano (2000-2003) initially disappointed
feminists by reasserting a commitment to less divisive political issues
(Ríos Tobar 2003). In the latter part of del Piano’s term at Sernam, the
Ministry shifted to an outspoken support of divorce legislation, and this
continued with the appointment of Cecilia Pérez (Independent) in 2003.
Pérez also pushed for the resolution of legislative initiatives that had
stalled in the Senate. Initial indications are that Laura Albornoz (PDC),
President Bachelet’s appointee to head the Ministry, envisions an
ambitious policy role for the Sernam. She has already signaled her
intention to renew debate on an electoral quota law that would boost
women’s representation in the Congress.
Regardless of a particular Minister ’s degree of openness to feminist
policymaking, congressional representatives still retain incentives to
promote their own legislative initiatives on women’s rights. Feminist
representatives must balance loyalty to their party and constituency
concerns against a desire to pursue feminist policy reforms. If
representatives lose “ownership” of a bill to Sernam, they lose control
over the bill’s content, and they can no longer claim credit for the
resulting legislation. Therefore, while recognizing the advantages that
come from executive sponsorship of legislation, feminist representatives
still struggle to maintain an independent legislative agenda. The ability
of advocates of women’s rights to pursue controversial policy reform in
the absence of executive sponsorship is further complicated by women’s
overall low representation in the legislature9.
8. Researchers have suggested that Sernam’s desire to control the legislative agenda on
women’s rights came in part from its desire to assert its influence within the larger bureaucracy
(Nikki Craske 1999; Ann Matear 1996; Fiona Macauley 1998; Georgina Waylen 1997).
9.  While not all  women representatives are feminist,  the number of women
representatives is nevertheless significant because women are overall more likely to
express interest in issues concerning women, relative to male representatives of their
party. In the Chilean case, for example, where support for feminist legislation has
expanded beyond the Concertación, it has first won the support of women representatives
from RN, such as María Angélica Cristi, Lily Pérez and Marina Prochelle.
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In critical ways, therefore, the Chilean system works against
institutional cooperation. When feminist policymakers succeed in
overcoming these obstacles, they must still confront the larger cultural
opposition to feminist that blocks attempts to reform laws on women’s
rights. Feminist policymakers must attempt to frame their proposals in a
way that reduces this opposition and to negotiate the content of their
bills to try to gain support for passage. However, these strategies may
exact a high cost in terms of the integrity of the original proposals.
Strategic Framing
In their analysis of the class and gender cleavages in women’s rights
legislation in Chile, Blofield and Haas (2005: 2-3) explain:
Support for or opposition to reform on women’s rights is only partially
linked to the economic left-right dimension. It also touches on deeply held
beliefs about women’s roles within the family and their participation in
society. Conservative discourse tends to characterize the traditional family
and the different social roles of men and women within it to be the natural,
complementary outgrowth of the biological differences between women
and men. Conservative social and political actors thus oppose proposals
that aim to rebalance this traditional structure. By contrast, feminist
research focuses on the ways traditional conceptions of the family
disadvantage women (for example, through women’s double labor burden,
their social and legal inequality within marriage, and their economic
dependency on men). For this reason, feminists often frame their
arguments in terms of women’s individual rights, and the primacy of these
individual rights over the socially constructed obligations connected to the
roles of wife, mother, etc. These arguments are often reflected in policy
proposals by the Left (and to a lesser degree, the political center).
In the absence of executive support for legislation, congressional
representatives need to build a broad base of support for their
legislation earlier in the process. In a political environment where
conservative parties maintain a strong electoral presence and the
Catholic Church is an influential force in shaping public discourse on
controversial social issues, feminist policymakers’ ability to strategically
frame policy proposals becomes a critical factor for passage. This has led
to one of the most important characteristics of successful congressional
legislation on women’s rights: the conscious moderation of a bill’s
framing and content to appeal to congressional conservatives. On a
wide-ranging number of issues, including domestic violence, day care,
paternity, divorce and abortion, feminists attempted defend their
proposals on the basis of what was good for the family as a whole. As
explained by Adriana Muñoz:
There’s a modification of the language, of the focus. There was an
attempt to “de-radicalize” the issue [of women’s rights] because we
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understood that there was an entrenched rejection from the Right, and
also from the political center, also from the Christian Democrats, who
have rejected “women’s issues”, stigmatizing them as feminist, ultra-
radical and anti-system10.
While feminists can count on the Left parties to be generally supportive
of most feminist policy proposals, they must consider the degree of
controversy a proposal is likely to cause within the PDC. As is evident in
Table 2, near unanimity is required within the Concertación for a proposal
to have a chance of passage. In some cases, moderate representatives
have signed onto feminist legislation, counterbalancing the opposition of
conservative Christian Democrats. The more controversial the bill the
more critical presentation of the proposal becomes. As illustrated in the
case studies that follow, it is on the most controversial bills that
feminists make the most concerted effort to link their support to a
concern for the family. This has led to a re-evaluation by feminist
legislators of the possibility of radical legislative change. Deputy Muñoz
concludes, “Now I think we’ve achieved things, but we’ve achieved
them a la chilena as we always say, very slowly, so no one notices”11.
This “culture of accommodation” (Grau, 1997) has been criticized by
many feminists, who argue that it cedes too much political ground to
political conservatives. Feminists inside and outside the state debate the
point at which “something becomes worse than nothing”. As explained
by a member of La Morada, a feminist NGO that has closely monitored
policy developments on women’s rights:
I don’t believe that something is better than nothing. I thought so at one
time, when I believed that compromise was necessary, [but now] I believe
that one can go on supporting what one believes in… The discourse of
the Right will be the same, whether we keep quiet or declare our
differences. The discourse of the Right is the discourse of the traditional
Catholic Church, and it’s not only the Right, I think there are also a lot of
progressive groups that employ the same discourse12.
María Elena Valenzuela, a long-time member of the women’s movement
who later worked at Sernam, similarly argues that the idea of consensus
in Chile does not imply a negotiation of political differences, but rather
the avoidance of divisive issues at all costs, as illustrated by the intra-
family violence bill:
In practice, “consensus” means that we’re going to behave as though we
have no differences. We’re not going to negotiate our differences, what
doesn’t unite. We’re going to make agreements based on what we agree
upon, and the other things, we’ll almost act as if they don’t exist. And
women’s rights is an issue that divides. So we’re going to work out an
agreement on this issue as if we didn’t think so differently... So for this
10. Interview with the author, June 5, 2001.
11. Interview with the author, June 5, 2001.
12. Author’s interview with Veronica Matus, January 9, 1997.
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reason you’ll often encounter situations that really don’t satisfy anyone,
instead of arriving at something that is the fruit of all of us13.
There are, therefore, limits to strategic framing and negotiation of feminist
proposals. The point at which a proposal for reform becomes “worse than
nothing” was debated in each of the case studies detailed below.
Case Studies
While my theory of feminist policymaking emerges from an examination
of all feminist legislative bills introduced between 1990 and 2002, I
utilize three particular case studies in this article to illustrate my
argument: the 1994 Intra-Family Violence Law (introduced in 1991); the
(unsuccessful) Therapeutic Abortion bill (introduced in 1991); and the
2004 Divorce Law (introduced in 1995). Why these case studies? All
three are important issues for the feminist community. They have each
been the subject of multiple legislative proposals, but have met with
varying success. Each has a distinct dynamic on the two main
explanatory factors: institutional cooperation and strategic framing. As a
result, each had a different trajectory and outcome. Finally, the dynamic
of each one influenced the subsequent strategies used on later bills. In
sum, this is a story about political learning, and how feminists learned
to maneuver within challenging institutional and cultural terrain.
Domestic Violence
Significance of the Bill
The Intra-Family Violence Law (VIF) illustrates the often difficult
institutional relationship between the leadership of Sernam and
feminists in Congress, as they attempt to initiate their own policy
agendas. Competition between the Minister of Sernam and congressional
representatives over ownership of domestic violence legislation led to
poor institutional cooperation on the bill. Congressional representatives
and members of the movement blamed the Ministry for weaknesses in
the resulting Intra-Family Violence law. Cultural opposition to domestic
violence legislation was lower than on the other proposals examined
here but was still a factor in the final shape of the legislation, which
lacked the necessary funding and was weak on victim protection and on
sanctions for abusers. In this case, moderate institutional cooperation
and moderate strategic framing led to only moderate success – the bill
passed but in a form that was widely criticized on content. A decade
13. Interview with the author, January 9, 1997.
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after the passage of the law, an improved institutional relationship
between the leadership of Sernam and congressional feminists led to a
successful effort to improve the VIF law.
Institutional Cooperation
Violence against women was a central policy issue for the women’s
movement. Feminists succeeded in calling attention to the issue of
violence against women and in connecting it with the broader issues of
human rights and regime violence14. Following the transition to
democracy, both the newly created National Women’s Ministry (Sernam)
and feminist representatives developed legislative proposals on the issue
of domestic violence. Socialist Deputies Adriana Muñoz and Sergio
Aguiló introduced the first domestic violence bill in September 1990.
They defined “domestic violence,” as “that which, [even] without
leaving marks or bruises, abuses in deed or word one’s father, mother, or
child, be they legitimate or illegitimate, or any other relative, a spouse or
domestic partner”15. The bill included all family members in its
definition of domestic violence, but the details of the bill were
specifically focused on the physical and psychological abuse of women
by their husbands or partners, which constituted the majority of cases of
family violence16.
The only sanction in force at the time required non-family witnesses and
physical evidence of injury to take action against the aggressor. The law
also failed to provide for the immediate removal of the accused
aggressor from the home once a complaint had been filed. The question
of how much protection the law needed to give to victims of abuse was
complicated by the fact that shelters for abused women were (and
continue to be) almost non-existent in Chile. The bill allowed for anyone
with direct knowledge of abuse to file a complaint, it instituted the
means for removing the aggressor from the home, effecting a restraining
order for place of work or school, and it set up a system of family
support for the period in which the aggressor was away from the home.
The bill indicated that therapy for the aggressor would be a mandatory
component of any program of rehabilitation, together with options for
prison sentences, fines, and community service work for the
municipality.
The start of the extraordinary legislative session forced Deputies Muñoz
and Aguiló to seek executive sponsorship from Sernam for the bill.
14. This linkage is illustrated by the now famous demand of the women’s movement in
Chile, “Democracy in the country and in the home” (See Frohmann and Valdés, 1993).
15. Bill 451-07, Article 1, cited in Legislative session 32a, p. 3170, August 21, 1991.
16. The bill noted that fully 76% of abuse in Chile was by men toward women (“La Mujer
Maltratada” cited on p. 2626, session 30a, December 15, 1992).
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However, in January 1991, Sernam introduced a bill on domestic
violence into Congress as an executive proposal. Sernam’s bill on “intra-
family violence” closely resembled the joint proposal that had been
negotiated between the Ministry and Deputies Muñoz and Aguiló17.
Following protests by Deputies Muñoz and Aguiló18, Sernam agreed to
withdraw its bill in favor of the original congressional proposal, but
insisted on an active role for itself in the amendment process in return
for sponsorship.
While Sernam’s intense involvement in the shaping of the legislation
was resented by some of the bill’s supporters, this executive sponsorship
also brought with it clear political advantages. None of the bill’s
congressional sponsors sat on the committees that would debate the bill,
but Sernam Minister Alvear had permanent access to the committees
and invited Deputies Muñoz and Aguiló to accompany the Ministry’s
legal team to the hearings on the bill, in both the Chamber of Deputies
and later in the joint committees that would resolve differences between
the Chamber and Senate versions of the bill. In addition, Sernam invited
members of key feminist organizations working on violence against
women to testify before the committees and submit data on the issue of
domestic violence for the committee reports19. For both feminist
representatives and members of the women’s movement, Sernam’s
involvement with the bill thus created crucial opportunities for them to
participate in the policy process. Throughout the bill’s three-year
progress through the Congress, it was included in the extraordinary
legislative sessions and was declared urgent at key moments.
Strategic Framing and Negotiation
In order to overcome conservative opposition to the bill in the Congress,
Sernam’s Minister agreed to a number of content changes that had the
cumulative effect of shifting it toward a focus on the maintenance of
family unity over protection of victims of abuse. Sernam’s revisions to
the bill, approved by the committees, increased the original bill’s
emphasis on non-incarceration options for dealing with cases of abuse,
including community service work in addition to therapy. Most
critically, the final version of the bill gave judges discretion over when,
and if, to remove the aggressor from the home.
17. La Nación, January 19, 1991; Muñoz interview with the author, June 5, 2001.
18. The deputies held a press conference and declared, “The government is not respecting
those minimal areas in which we can legislate” (El Fortin, January 19, 1991).
19. Among the organizations that testified before Congress on the bill were ISIS
International, the Network Against Violence (a collective of feminist organizations
focusing on violence against women), the Women’s Institute of Santiago, the “Women’s
House” of Valparaíso, and the Santiago-based Women’s Collective of La Florida.
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Feminists at the hearings insisted that women would not denounce
abuse if the abuser remained in the home following the filing of
charges, but Sernam’s legal team argued that developing non-
incarceration measures for responding to domestic violence would
make it less likely that women would later drop the charges rather
than see their partners sent to jail. Members of the feminist community
widely criticized these changes to the original bill, arguing that the
lack of victim protection under the new law would increase the danger
to women who reported abuse. For example, Paulina Weber of
MEMCH in Santiago20 blamed Sernam for altering the intra-family
violence bill until it became:
[…] more educative than disruptive [to the marriage], to the point that if
a man hits a woman, the man has to educate himself so that he’ll stop
beating the woman. It allows him to demonstrate that he won’t continue
to beat the woman; he’s forced to submit to therapy so that he won’t
continue to beat the woman, but in no way should this imply that the
couple ceases to function. In other words, the concept behind it is that the
couple cannot be split apart, and it’s recommended that the man be good
and not beat the woman, and to the woman it’s recommended that she
have a lot of patience with the man, and this is where justice ends – it
ends with the judge calling the parties together and giving the man a slap
on the wrist and saying “behave yourself” to him, and saying “have
patience” to the woman21.
Weber viewed the intra-family violence law as enshrining the “ludicrous”
idea that a woman in such a situation must defend her marriage over her
own life22. In addition, the resulting law was widely criticized for its
failure to secure the funding necessary for implementation.
Feminist Learning in the Wake of the Intra-Family Violence Law
The perception by many feminists that Sernam’s involvement with
domestic violence legislation ultimately resulted in a conservative and
largely unenforceable law shaped their expectations about future
cooperation with the Ministry. Feminist organizations, already beset by
external and internal pressures, decreased their public presence in the
wake of the passage of the VIF law. Feminist representatives in
Congress, stung by the public battle with the Ministry over ownership of
the bill, and recognizing the Ministry’s resistance to support more
controversial feminist issues, such as abortion and divorce, resigned
themselves to the need to legislate independently of Ministry support.
20. MEMCH (Movement for the Emancipation of the Chilean Woman) is one of the oldest
and most respected feminist organizations in Chile.
21. Interview with the author, March 25, 1997.
22. Ibid.
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Despite the weaknesses of the VIF law, it laid the groundwork for later
attempts to improve the law. In 1999, two feminist deputies, Adriana
Muñoz (now with the PPD) and fellow party member Maria Antonieta
Saa introduced a motion to strengthen protection for victims of domestic
abuse and increase funding for the law (Law 20.066). This bill, which
passed the Congress in 2005, explicitly criminalizes domestic violence
and allow for rapid removal of the aggressor from the home. Together
with the new Family Tribunals (created in 2005), the new law should
allow for a more rapid processing of abuse complaints and a higher rate
of convictions23.
Abortion
Significance of the Bill
The Therapeutic Abortion bill illustrates the enduring challenge of
tackling controversial policy issues in the absence of executive support
and in the face of entrenched cultural opposition. Sernam refused to
support congressional efforts to decriminalize therapeutic abortion, and
congressional representatives alone lacked the institutional strength and
political support to overcome widespread opposition to the bill from the
Right, conservative Christian Democrats, and the Catholic Church. The
lack of institutional cooperation on the bill, together with poor political
strategizing on the part of the bill’s sponsors, led to the failure of the bill
in congressional committee. Thirteen years after the failure of the
therapeutic abortion bill, representatives introduced a similar initiative
into Congress, indicating an increasing willingness among representatives
across the political spectrum to reopen debate on the issue.
Institutional Cooperation
Therapeutic abortion was legal in Chile from 1936 until 1989, when it
was criminalized in one of the last acts of the outgoing military
government. Today, abortion is illegal in Chile even if the mother ’s
life is at stake. Nevertheless, enforcement of the abortion law is
relatively weak, and the abortion rate in Chile is high24. Public
23. Jen Ross, 2004. “Chileans Facing up to Domestic Violence.” Women’s eNews,
Feminist.com, December 31.
24. It is difficult to estimate the rate of abortion accurately, given its illegality. The
Guttmacher Institute (www.guttmacher.com) estimates that one-third of pregnancies in
Chile end in abortion. However, while there is wide acceptance of the existence of
significant rates of abortion in Chile, some researchers have also argued that the relative
reliability of Chilean data compared to that of other Latin American countries may lead to
an overestimation of Chile’s abortion rate.
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opinion polls since the transition support the decriminalization of
therapeutic abortion25.
Socialist Deputy Adriana Muñoz was among those members of the
political Left who had been calling for liberalization of abortion laws
since before the transition to democracy, and, following her election to
the Chamber of Deputies, she introduced a bill to re-legalize therapeutic
abortion in 1991. The bill was co-signed by four fellow party members,
Armando Arancibia, Carlos Smok, Juan Pablo Letelier, and Carlos
Montes, and the following month Humanist/Green Party Deputy Laura
Rodriguez also signed on. The bill itself was a mere two sentences long:
“Only toward therapeutic ends may a pregnancy be interrupted. To
undertake this intervention the documented opinion of two medical-
surgeons is required”26. Socialist Deputy Adriana Muñoz explained:
The fact that we debate [abortion] doesn’t mean that abortions will
increase in Chile or that we are against life. What we are doing is
recognizing a fact of reality and preventing legislation from becoming
outmoded, as it is now, when there exists a law which penalizes abortion
and more than 150,000 women abort every year27.
Despite the Socialist Party’s position in favor of decriminalization, there
was no party-level support for the bill. The therapeutic abortion bill
aroused enormous opposition from the Catholic Church and from
conservative political sectors, including Christian Democrats, and many
Socialists felt that to be identified with such a bill early on would hurt
the party’s future electoral chances, especially at the presidential level.
Therefore, the party did not issue any statements in support of Muñoz
when she was vilified in the press and failed to support her candidacy
for the 1994 congressional elections28. Public support from interested
feminist organizations, such as the Open Forum on Health and
Reproductive Rights29, also failed to materialize. Feminist organizations
25. For example, a 1989 CERC survey found that 75.8% of respondents “believe that
the interruption of a pregnancy should be legally permitted when the mother ’s life is
at risk or the child would be born deformed. Similar survey results were found by
APROFA-CERC (1989, 1990), DIAGNOS (1984), and FLACSO (1988). For more recent
analysis of public opinion on abortion, see Blofield 2006.
26. Bill # 499-7, p. 1.
27. From interview in La Nación, June 27, 1991.
28. Muñoz blames her failure to be re-elected on the visible lack of party support she
received in her district, and she believes the lack of support stemmed from the
introduction of her therapeutic abortion bill against the wishes of the party leadership.
Muñoz switched her party affiliation to the PPD and was re-elected to the Chamber of
Deputies in 1998.
29 In 1985 an alliance of NGOs, the, was formed to focus attention on the issue of abortion
and to coordinate movement action in this area.  But given the strength of social and
political forces opposing the decriminalization of abortion laws, it has been extremely
difficult to date to promote public debate on the issue, and abortion has not been a focal
point of mobilization of the women’s movement.
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complained that Muñoz had not consulted with them in the
development of the bill30.
In the absence of broad party support for the legislation, the bill would
only survive with executive support. As expected, given the Christian
Democratic Party’s official position in opposition to abortion, Sernam
(headed by Christian Democrat Soledad Alvear) also refused to support
the proposal.
Strategic Framing and Negotiation
The therapeutic abortion legislation was framed as a return to Chile’s
previous law. Anticipating the types of arguments that would be
mounted against the bill, Muñoz downplayed references to individual
rights as a defense of decriminalization. Taking the existence of abortion
as a given, the preamble to the bill concentrated instead on the harm
done to the family as a result of the complete ban on abortion, namely:
The numerous psycho-social consequences for children and for the family
in general, which result from the loss of the life or health of the mother,
which not only destroys a marriage but also implies a traumatic
experience for the children, who will suffer a lack of affection because a
person fundamental to their formative development, in the sense of
transmitting values, knowledge, etc., has disappeared. The gravity of the
situation of small children due to the absence of the mother, [because she
is] poor and/or single or deceased, leads to [the children’s] probable
“internment” in a Children’s Home... homelessness, or in the majority of
cases, life in foster homes31.
The proposal thus conceived of women who would seek abortions as
already mothers, who needed to be able to care for the children they
already had. In this way, the bill frames abortion as a public health issue,
rather than a matter of women’s rights.
Feminist Learning in the Wake of the Therapeutic Abortion Bill
Given the lack of institutional support for the therapeutic abortion bill,
both from Sernam and within the Congress, its failure was over-
determined. Nevertheless, feminists took a number of lessons from the
experience. In the short term, they realized the futility of attempting to
legislate on such a controversial issue, in the absence of visible public
support for policy reform. Feminists also gained experience framing
their proposals to try to overcome conservative opposition.
30. Author ’s interview with Forum member Fanny Berlogosky, Santiago, June 1997.
31. Chamber of Deputies, Legislative session 41a, September 17, 1991, p. 4087.
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The introduction of the therapeutic abortion bill also sparked a
conservative legislative backlash, with the introduction of several
legislative proposals aimed at increasing the penalties for providing and
procuring an abortion32. The introduction of the original bill, together
with conservative counter measures, allowed for the emergence of
public debate on some aspects of the issue of abortion, such as the
obvious class bias in prosecuting women who abort33. While stopping
short of advocating decriminalization of abortion, Sernam’s second
Minister, Christian Democrat Josefina Bilbao, spoke out publicly against
the criminal prosecution of women who abort, as did other Christian
Democratic leaders, such as then-Deputy Mariana Aylwin.
More significantly, the political and cultural terrain in Chile may have
evolved to the point that another attempt at legislating this issue may
find more success. In 2003 and 2004, bills were introduced to
decriminalize therapeutic abortion and to establish legal protections for
reproductive rights (bills 3702 and 3197, respectively). Particularly
noteworthy about these most recent attempts is the fact that both bills
framed the issues in explicitly “pro-family” terms (the therapeutic
abortion bill closely mirrors Muñoz’s original effort), and both were
introduced by a coalition of representatives from the Socialist Party, the
PPD, the PDC, and Renovación Nacional. As of this writing, the
executive has yet to respond to either initiative.
Divorce
Significance of the Bill
Finally, the Divorce Law illustrates the potential to pass fundamental
policy reform even on controversial policy issues, if feminists can
successfully strategize around institutional constraints and cultural
opposition. Lacking executive support from Sernam for the 1995
proposal, congressional representatives were forced to agree to
significant content changes to gain the political support needed to keep
the proposal alive in Congress. In the wake of Lagos’ election as
President, Sernam’s leadership began to actively support the divorce
legislation. This institutional pressure in favor of reform allowed
representatives to press for the passage of more sweeping legislation.
With the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996, Chile became the only
nation to lack some type of legal divorce. Divorce a la Chilena refers to
32. See Haas (2000).
33. It is disproportionately poor women, who must resort to unsafe abortions, who have
medical complications that then prompt police investigation and prosecution. See Casas
1996.
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the one method of obtaining a civil annulment: committing perjury
before the Civil Registrar by claiming that one lied on some aspect of the
original marriage license, thereby voiding the contract. Efforts to
legalize divorce focused on the recognition of the widespread use of
perjury to gain civil annulments and the need to have the State replace
this informal system with a set of logical and equitable legal guidelines
to regulate the dissolution of marriage.
Institutional Cooperation
The Left introduced several divorce bills in 1991, 1993 and 1994. All
three bills referred to individual rights guaranteed by the constitution as
well as the fraudulent system of annulments, and outlined a liberal
divorce regime. They sought to guarantee divorce in cases of mutual
consent, aggravated circumstances, and separation of the couple for over
one year. None of the bills garnered support beyond the Left, and none
was debated in committee.
While the leadership of Sernam criticized the system of fraudulent
annulments and expressed informal support for the idea of divorce,
prior to the Lagos administration, Sernam refused to offer formal
support for divorce legislation. Despite Sernam’s reticence and the vocal
opposition to reform from the Right and the Chilean Catholic Church34,
wide support for reform within the Left and growing support among
sectors of the PDC, contributed to a more auspicious political context for
reform on this issue than was the case with abortion. Representatives
believed that, with enough strategic framing of a proposal and with
concerted efforts to reach out to moderates beyond the Left, divorce
legislation was possible, even in the absence of executive support.
Strategic Framing
The 1995 divorce bill is qualitatively different from its predecessors in
content and, as a result, in the breadth of political support for the
measure. Introduced by two Christian Democratic Deputies with broad
support from the Left and even a few representatives from Renovación
Nacional, the “New Civil Marriage Law” made major concessions to
conservatives on content and also reframed the bill to be more “pro-
family”. The preservation of family unity as a general rule was the
foundation of the new bill. For example, a mandatory five-year waiting
period for a divorce was added to the bill, and judges were given broad
powers to deny requests for divorce. Combined with the closing of the
annulment loophole, the 1995 bill in effect made divorce much more
34. See Haas (1999) for a detailed analysis of the role of the Chilean Church in the divorce
debate.
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difficult to come by than under the current system, and this allowed
Christian Democrats (and members of the Right) to argue that in fact the
bill would strengthen the family. The very title of the 1995 bill reflects
efforts to avoid even the word “divorce”. As explained by Christian
Democrat Ignacio Walker, one of the bill’s sponsors, “It’s not a divorce
bill. It’s a marriage bill” (Walker, 2000). Feminist representatives
explicitly recognized the strategic tradeoffs necessary to propel the bill
through the Congress. PPD Deputy Antonieta Saa explained:
It’s not a bill from one deputy or two deputies from the same party, but
rather, this proposal reflects a process of negotiation in the construction
of the bill with deputies from all the parties except the UDI… And in this
regard I had to set aside my own desire to draft a bill which would allow
divorce in cases of mutual consent, but I did it thinking that if we gained
this alliance, we would, at the very least, begin an historical process in
the country: a law, which was the fundamental thing35.
After passage of the bill by the Chamber in 1997, it was sent to the
Senate where it lay buried in a hostile Justice Committee until 2002. The
critical factor that propelled the bill through the Senate was the
introduction of executive pressure in support of the bill. Socialist
Ricardo Lagos had promised during his presidential campaign to push
for the legalization of divorce. Following his election in 2000, Lagos
gradually became more aggressive in support of the legislation, and
eventually forced the Senate to debate an executive-modified version of
the bill. Sernam, led by Ministers Adriana del Piano (PPD; 2000-2003)
and Cecilia Pérez (Independent; 2003-2006), and the Ministry of Justice,
led by former Sernam Minister Soledad Alvear (PDC), worked to update
the Chamber bill.
Executive support allowed some of the previously abandoned aspects of
earlier divorce bills to be reintroduced. The executive-modified version
added needed protections for children. Most significantly, the final
version of the bill reinstituted divorce by mutual consent, although
couples must be separated for a year before filing for divorce, and
judges make take up to an additional three years to complete the filing.
Couples must also submit to mandatory mediation. The divorce bill
passed the Congress and was signed into law in May 2004.
Feminist Learning in the Wake of the Divorce Law
The Divorce Law illustrates the potential to pass fundamental policy
reform even on controversial policy issues, if feminists can successfully
strategize around institutional constraints and cultural opposition. We
can identify two phases to the policymaking dynamic on this legislation.
35. From interview with the author, January 15, 1997.
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In the first phase, the absence of institutional cooperation necessitated
significant compromises on the content of the bill. In the second phase,
strong executive support allowed representatives to renegotiate more
fundamental policy reform. The divorce bill illustrates the clearest
example of learning by feminist representatives. Compared with
previous divorce bills, feminist representatives approached the 1995
divorce bill much more strategically, negotiating with the conservative
opposition early in the bill’s development. Major concessions on the
bill’s content, together with a conscious effort to frame the topic within a
pro-family discourse, allowed feminist representatives to build support
for the bill early in the legislative process, which was a key factor in the
bill’s passage in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997. Executive support
served to reactivate the bill in the Senate, and most importantly, to pass
a more progressive version of the bill than the original congressional
proposal.
Conclusions
The return of electoral democracy in 1989 ushered in a new institutional
structure to Chilean politics. The analysis of feminist policymaking since
the transition demonstrates that political actors do not automatically
comprehend the most effective strategy for gaining political advantage
in a given institutional context. Rather, successful political strategy
evolves over time, with repeated political interaction. In Chile, both
institutional structure and cultural opposition to feminism constrain the
opportunities for progressive policymaking on women’s rights.
Feminists working within the political system have learned that
executive support is a critical factor for legislative success, but that this
sponsorship often comes at the cost of losing ownership of legislative
initiatives and control over their content. Framing feminist proposals in
language that appeals to cultural conservatives and compromising on
the content of legislative initiatives can help build support for passage,
but the resulting laws may be inoperable or, in some cases, worse than
the preexisting policy. Over the past sixteen years, feminists in Chile
have learned to strategize more effectively within this complex political
landscape, and charting the legislative histories of their proposals on
domestic violence, abortion and divorce illuminates this process.
The recent increase in congressional initiatives, and particularly in cross-
party support for legislation on abortion and reproductive rights, seems
to provide further evidence of the diffusion of feminist ideals noted in
recent research by scholars such as Alvarez (1999) and Ríos Tobar (2003).
Interest in and support for feminist policy has clearly expanded beyond
the small core of feminist representatives responsible for most feminist
initiatives in the first administrations. The election of Michelle Bachelet
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to the presidency, and the appointment of women to half the executive
cabinet, including Christian Democrat Laura Albornoz to head Sernam,
is further indication of the increasing influence of feminism in Chilean
politics. The passage of an electoral quota law, a central political goal for
Bachelet and Albornoz, would create further opportunities for women,
and feminists in particular, to impact policymaking.
Important and relevant on its own terms, the Chilean case also adds to
our knowledge of gender and politics and expands our understanding of
the policymaking process in different political, institutional and cultural
contexts. The institutional and cultural factors I analyze in Chile have
applicability to Latin America more broadly, where intra-governmental
power struggles and conservative political forces have a long history.
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